Stress Testing Monte Carlo Assumptions by Lee, Marlena
University of Pennsylvania 
ScholarlyCommons 
Wharton Pension Research Council Working 
Papers Wharton Pension Research Council 
10-1-2013 
Stress Testing Monte Carlo Assumptions 
Marlena Lee 
Dimensional Fund Advisors, marlena.lee@dimensional.com 
Follow this and additional works at: https://repository.upenn.edu/prc_papers 
 Part of the Economics Commons 
Lee, Marlena, "Stress Testing Monte Carlo Assumptions" (2013). Wharton Pension Research Council 
Working Papers. 131. 
https://repository.upenn.edu/prc_papers/131 
The published version of this Working Paper may be found in the 2014 publication: Recreating Sustainable 
Retirement: Resilience, Solvency, and Tail Risk. 
This paper is posted at ScholarlyCommons. https://repository.upenn.edu/prc_papers/131 
For more information, please contact repository@pobox.upenn.edu. 
Stress Testing Monte Carlo Assumptions 
Abstract 
Despite the evidence that returns are fat-tailed and that expected returns vary through time, most Monte 
Carlo simulations assume returns are independent and identically normally distributed. This study 
incorporates these return patterns in retirement simulations to illustrate how common assumptions about 
returns impact the output of Monte Carlo simulations. 
Disciplines 
Economics 
Comments 
The published version of this Working Paper may be found in the 2014 publication: Recreating 
Sustainable Retirement: Resilience, Solvency, and Tail Risk. 
This working paper is available at ScholarlyCommons: https://repository.upenn.edu/prc_papers/131 
1Recreating Sustainable 
Retirement
Resilience, Solvency, and Tail Risk
EDITED BY
Olivia S. Mitchell, 
Raimond Maurer, and  
P. Brett Hammond
1
Great Clarendon Street, Oxford, OX2 6DP,
United Kingdom
Oxford University Press is a department of the University of Oxford.
It furthers the University’s objective of excellence in research, scholarship,
and education by publishing worldwide. Oxford is a registered trade mark of
Oxford University Press in the UK and in certain other countries
© Pension Research Council, The Wharton School, University of Pennsylvania 2014
The moral rights of the authors have been asserted
First Edition published  in 2014
Impression: 1
All rights reserved. No part of this publication may be reproduced, stored in
a retrieval system, or transmitted, in any form or by any means, without the
prior permission in writing of Oxford University Press, or as expressly permitted
by law, by licence or under terms agreed with the appropriate reprographics
rights organization. Enquiries concerning reproduction outside the scope of the
above should be sent to the Rights Department, Oxford University Press, at the
address above
You must not circulate this work in any other form
and you must impose this same condition on any acquirer
Published in the United States of America by Oxford University Press
198 Madison Avenue, New York, NY 10016, United States of America
British Library Cataloguing in Publication Data
Data available
Library of Congress Control Number: 2014940448
ISBN 978–0–19–871924–3
Printed and bound by
CPI Group (UK) Ltd, Croydon, CR0 4YY
Links to third party websites are provided by Oxford in good faith and
for information only. Oxford disclaims any responsibility for the materials
contained in any third party website referenced in this work.
Contents
List of Figures ix
List of Tables xiii
Notes on Contributors xv
1. Recreating Retirement Sustainability 1
Olivia S. Mitchell and Raimond Maurer
Part I. Capital Market and Model Risk 
2. Managing Capital Market Risk for Retirement 9
Enrico Biffis and Robert Kosowski
3. Implications for Long-term Investors of the Shifting Distribution of 
Capital Market Returns 30
James Moore and Niels Pedersen
4. Stress Testing Monte Carlo Assumptions 60
Marlena I. Lee
Part II. Longevity Risk
5. Modeling and Management of Longevity Risk 71
Andrew Cairns
6. Longevity Risk Management, Corporate Finance, and Sustainable 
Pensions 89
Guy Coughlan
7. Model Risk, Mortality Heterogeneity, and Implications for Solvency 
and Tail Risk 113
Michael Sherris and Qiming Zhou
8. The Securitization of Longevity Risk and Its Implications for 
Retirement Security 134
Richard MacMinn, Patrick Brockett, Jennifer Wang, Yijia Lin, and Ruilin Tian
viii Contents
Part III. Regulatory and Political Risk
 9. Evolving Roles for Pension Regulations: Toward Better Risk Control? 163
E. Philip Davis
10. Developments in European Pension Regulation: Risks and Challenges 186
Stefan Lundbergh, Ruben Laros, and Laura Rebel
11. Extreme Risks and the Retirement Anomaly 215
Tim Hodgson
Part IV. Implications for Plan Sponsors
12. Risk Budgeting and Longevity Insurance: Strategies for Sustainable 
Defined Benefit Pension Funds 247
Amy Kessler
13. The Funding Debate: Optimizing Pension Risk within a Corporate 
Risk Budget 273
Geoff Bauer, Gordon Fletcher, Julien Halfon, and Stacy Scapino
The Pension Research Council 293
Index 297
Chapter 4
Stress Testing Monte Carlo Assumptions
Marlena I. Lee
Monte Carlo simulations are a useful financial planning tool serving several pur-
poses. They are often used to forecast wealth outcomes into the future for the 
purposes of  financial planning.1 One can input assumptions about returns, sav-
ing, and spending needs, and the simulation reports how likely these goals are to 
be achieved, given the assumptions of  the model. This framework is immensely 
valuable for helping investors understand the key factors that can influence their 
long-term investment goals. But Monte Carlo simulations also require some key 
assumptions to simplify a very complex problem.
This chapter examines the importance of  three assumptions central to most 
Monte Carlo simulations:  that stock returns are normally distributed, expected 
returns are constant over time, and return parameters are known to the user. None 
of  these assumptions is completely consistent with reality. Returns are known to 
have fat tails, meaning extreme events have occurred more often than expected 
under a normal distribution. Expected returns also likely vary through time and, 
most importantly, they are unobservable, let alone precisely measured. Although 
underlying Monte Carlo assumptions are not an exact description of  the world, 
the usefulness of  the simulations depends on whether they can still provide use-
ful insights to guide financial planning. Given that we know the assumptions are 
only approximations, this chapter assesses how users might interpret Monte Carlo 
results that attempt to forecast wealth outcomes into the future.
The Behavior of Black Swans
Stock returns tend to have more extreme observations than would be expected 
under a normal distribution. For example, global market declines in excess of  
40 percent should occur once every 540 years according to a normal distribution.2 
Yet since 1900, global markets have seen two such declines, once in 1931 during the 
Great Depression, and again in 2008 during the global financial crisis. Researchers 
have studied these tail returns since the early 1960s, although popular interest in 
these ‘black swans’ has risen with the recent bestselling book of  the same name.3
Figure 4.1 shows a histogram of  global equity returns relative to the normal 
distribution. This is generated using annual returns on global equities from 1900 
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to 2011 from the Dimson, Marsh, and Stauton Global Returns Database (Dimson 
et al. 2011). Much attention is often devoted to the negative tail events, although 
Figure 4.1 shows that extreme positive events also occur, such as the 71 percent 
return in 1933. Returns also tend to cluster around the mean much more than 
expected under a normal distribution. These patterns tend to offset, so that the 
assumption of  normality does not greatly impact the results of  Monte Carlo 
simulations.
To illustrate this point, 100,000 outcomes of  a 100 percent global equity portfo-
lio are simulated for 30 years. In the baseline Monte Carlo simulation, returns are 
assumed to be normally distributed with mean and standard deviation equal to that 
observed in historical data. A second simulation ‘bootstraps’ returns from actual 
historical data. This bootstrap simulation preserves many of  the characteristics of  
the actual distribution including the mean, standard deviation, fat tails, and skew-
ness of  returns. This means that market drops of  40 percent will occur 1.79 percent 
of  the time, instead of  0.19 percent of  the time. We repeat each simulation 100,000 
times.
Results are shown in Table 4.1. Historical returns appear in Row A, and the 
simulated returns in Rows B1–B2. As expected, both simulations produce averages 
and standard deviations t which are very similar to those observed in the histori-
cal data. Annualized average returns are within a few basis points, an acceptable 
range for sampling error. The bootstrap methodology better captures specific per-
centiles of  the historical distribution. Tail percentiles and the median match up 
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Figure 4.1. Histogram of  annual equity returns: 1900–2011.
Source: Dimson et al. (2011).
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almost perfectly in the bootstrap, while small discrepancies appear when returns 
are simulated from a normal distribution.
Table 4.2 shows growth of  wealth statistics after 30 years.4 The baseline Monte 
Carlo simulation, in Row A1, produces very similar results to the bootstrap simu-
lation in Row A2, although with slightly narrower tails. In other words, fat tails 
in the return distribution also result in fat tails in the wealth distribution over 
time. Annualized returns at the fifth percentile differ by 22 basis points per year. 
Accordingly, the assumption that returns are normally distributed does not greatly 
impact the results of  Monte Carlo simulations.5
Time-varying Expected Returns
Both theoretical and empirical research indicates that the expected equity risk pre-
mium varies over time. Investors demand a higher expected return to hold risky 
assets such as stocks, and this expected return should be higher during times of  
greater uncertainty, such as at the onset of  a recession. Some argue that this results 
Table 4.1 Summary statistics of  global equity returns, 1900–2011
Avg. Std. dev. Percentiles
5th 10th 50th 90th 95th N
A.  Historical 
returns
9.91 17.26 −18.09 −13.11 11.45 28.23 36.38 112
B.  Simulated returns
B1.  Baseline 
Monte 
Carlo
9.93 17.27 −18.50 −12.21 9.92 32.05 38.31 3,000,000
B2. Bootstrap 9.97 17.20 −18.09 −13.11 11.73 28.23 36.38 3,000,000
B3.  Bootstrap 
10yr
9.92 17.19 −18.09 −13.11 11.73 28.23 36.38 3,000,000
B4.  Random 
mean
9.90 17.34 −18.64 −12.34 9.91 32.12 38.41 3,000,000
C. Difference in annualized return from historical
C1.  Baseline 
Monte 
Carlo
0.02 −0.41 0.90 −1.53 3.82 1.93
C2. Bootstrap 0.07 0.00 0.00 0.28 0.00 0.00
C3.  Bootstrap 
10yr
0.01 0.00 0.00 0.28 0.00 0.00
C4.  Random 
mean
−0.01 −0.55 0.77 −1.54 3.89 2.03
Source: Author’s calculations derived from Dimson et al. (2011).
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in mean reversion in returns: following periods of  poor market returns, expected 
returns should be higher than average.6
All time series patterns in stock returns such as autocorrelation or variation 
around business cycles are assumed away in a typical Monte Carlo simulation. 
Each year, expected returns are assumed to be the same, regardless of  economic 
conditions or recent returns. It turns out that this is not a bad assumption. Using 
the framework from the previous section, next we show that incorporating time 
series patterns in returns has only a mild impact on simulation results.
We simulate a 100 percent global equity portfolio using a bootstrap simula-
tion very similar to that in the previous section, but with one important difference. 
Instead of  randomly selecting annual returns, we now randomly select ten-year 
returns by picking a random year t between 1900 and 2011. The return of  a simu-
lated portfolio for its first ten years equals the return in years t to t + 9.7 We repeat 
the process two more times, until we have returns for a 30-year investment horizon. 
Row B3 in Table 4.1 shows that the simulated returns are very similar to the actual 
distribution of  returns. The benefit of  this method is that it captures any variation 
in expected returns that might occur over the course of  ten-year return cycles.
This simulation generates portfolio outcomes with lower averages and less 
wealth dispersion than the baseline Monte Carlo simulation, as shown in Row A3 
of  Table 4.2. Tighter wealth outcomes are the result of  very slight mean reversion 
in the global equity data. Average returns are slightly higher following periods of  
Table 4.2. Simulated growth of  $1
Average Std dev Percentiles
5th 10th 50th 90th 95th
A.  Growth of  $1 over 30 years
A1.  Baseline 
Monte 
Carlo
15.55 15.74 2.51 3.47 10.89 32.63 44.02
A2. Bootstrap 15.79 15.97 2.35 3.36 11.03 33.29 45.10
A3.  Bootstrap 
10yr
14.59 14.13 3.15 3.97 10.21 29.85 40.88
A4.  Random 
mean
15.44 15.78 2.44 3.41 10.74 32.50 43.73
B.  Difference in annualized returns from baseline Monte Carlo (basis points)
B1.  Baseline 
Monte 
Carlo
– – – – – – –
B2. Bootstrap 6 –22 –11 4 8 9
B3.  Bootstrap 
10yr
–23 79 48 –23 –33 –28
B4.  Random 
mean
–3 –9 –6 –5 –2 –3
Source: Author’s calculations derived from Dimson et al. (2011).
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poor returns. This makes long-run returns, such as the ten-year returns in the simu-
lations, less risky than ten independently drawn annual observations.8 The effect is 
that very bad and very good outcomes are less likely. In the lower tail at the fifth per-
centile, this reduction in long-term risk works out to a positive difference in annual-
ized returns of  79 basis points. This benefit comes at the cost of  lower annualized 
returns in the upper part of  the wealth distribution.
Although mean reversion is good news for long-run investors, investors should 
be cautious about whether mean reversion will also occur in the future. Most of  the 
mean reversion in the global portfolio comes from the U.S., and results using World 
ex-U.S. do not display evidence of  mean reversion. Mean reversion is difficult to 
assess since even with more than a century of  returns, the sample contains only 
11 completely independent ten-year return observations. Given uncertainty about 
whether these patterns will hold in the future, one sensible approach would be to 
assume that expected returns are constant through time. If  mean reversion did 
appear in the future, this assumption will prove to be slightly conservative.
Uncertain Inputs
All of  the simulations thus far make a critical assumption, namely that the true 
return distribution is known. Of  course it is not. Nominal global equity returns 
have averaged about 10 percent over the period from 1900 to 2011, but there is 
substantial uncertainty about future expected returns.9 Even if  the distribution has 
not changed over time, there is a good chance that the expected nominal equity 
return ranges anywhere from 7 to 13 percent.10
To examine the impact of  uncertainty around expected returns, next we run a 
two-step simulation. We first randomly draw an expected return, µ , from a nor-
mal distribution with mean equal to the historical average and standard deviation 
equal to the standard error.11 Next, we randomly draw a return from a normal 
distribution with random mean µ  and standard deviation equal to the sample 
standard deviation. This simulation accounts for uncertainty around the expected 
return, but still assumes the standard deviation is known without error.
Return summary statistics in Row B4 of  Table 4.1 show that this simulation 
produces a very similar return profile to the other simulations. The extreme tails of  
the distribution are slightly wider than the baseline Monte Carlo simulation, and 
because it assumes returns are normally distributed, it does not perfectly match all 
points of  the historical distribution.
Wealth outcomes in Row A4 of  Table 4.2 show essentially identical results to the 
baseline Monte Carlo simulation. As long as the historical average is an unbiased 
estimate of  the true mean, which is true if  the distribution of  returns does not 
change over time, then uncertainty about the mean has no impact on the simula-
tion. But it is unclear whether historical averages can be considered an unbiased 
estimate of  future expected returns.
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The average historical excess return of  U.S. stocks over one-month Treasury 
bills has been about 8 percent from 1926 to 2011. Some Monte Carlo users may 
also use this figure as their assumption for the expected equity premium going for-
ward. But there are reasons to believe this estimate might be high. Extending the 
sample back to 1900 yields a U.S. equity premium of  about 7 percent, and expand-
ing globally lowers the equity premium to about 6 percent. Using long-term divi-
dend and earnings growth, Fama and French (2002) estimate an equity premium in 
the range of  2.6 to 4.3 percent. If  future expected returns are lower than historical 
averages, the impact on Monte Carlo simulations can be large.
Table 4.3 shows wealth outcomes for standard Monte Carlo simulations but with 
different levels of  expected return. The simulation with mean equal to the histori-
cal average embeds an equity premium of  about 6 percent. If  the equity premium 
is actually 8 percent, the simulations in the first row (C = −2 percent) would apply. 
Similarly, the last row corresponds to simulations with expected return of  about 
8 percent over T-bills. The results are dramatically different, with each percentage 
difference in expected return cumulating to a 30 percent difference in wealth over 
30 years. These results dwarf  the minor deviations that result from fat tails and 
mean reversion, and they highlight a critical flaw in Monte Carlo simulations when 
users use an upward-biased expected return assumption.
Conclusion
Monte Carlo simulations incorporate many assumptions that simplify reality. 
These assumptions are not perfect descriptions of  the world, but they appear to 
be decent approximations for some purposes. Moreover, simulation methods that 
better reflect historical returns do not dramatically impact results in our setting. 
Bootstrapping returns to account for extreme tail returns has little impact on the 
simulations relative to a simple assumption that returns are normal. And although 
Table 4.3. Monte Carlo simulations with varying expected returns
Avg. Std dev Percentiles
5th 10th 50th 90th 95th
C = –2% 9.13 9.48 1.41 1.96 6.31 19.31 26.18
–1% 11.93 12.23 1.88 2.61 8.30 25.14 33.99
0% 15.55 15.74 2.51 3.47 10.89 32.63 44.02
1% 20.22 20.21 3.33 4.59 14.26 42.27 56.89
2% 26.24 25.90 4.41 6.06 18.61 54.64 73.33
Note: Growth of  $1 over 30 years; expected return = historical average + C.
Source: Author’s calculations derived from Dimson et al. (2011).
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expected returns on equities do vary through time, it seems reasonable to simply 
assume that expected returns are constant through time.
One important assumption that does have a critical impact when using Monte 
Carlo simulations to project absolute future wealth is the long-run expected rate 
of  return on equities. Changing expected return assumptions dwarfs differences 
that arise from all other assumptions examined in this study. When using Monte 
Carlo to project future wealth, no tool, no matter how many bells and whistles, can 
escape this fundamental problem. Expected future returns are unobservable and 
are incredibly difficult to estimate precisely.
In our view, Monte Carlo simulations are a very useful financial planning tool. 
But understanding the tool’s limitations will help prevent its misuse. Monte Carlo 
output cannot be interpreted as a guarantee, since the model does not account for 
a myriad of  factors that can impact investment outcomes. Instead, Monte Carlo 
simulations should be viewed as a directional guide to let investors know if  they 
are roughly on track. Combined with frequent evaluation and investor discipline, 
Monte Carlo simulations are a useful component of  a sound financial plan to help 
increase the probability of  investor success.
Disclaimer
The projections or other information generated by Monte Carlo analysis tools 
regarding the likelihood of  various investment outcomes are hypothetical in 
nature, do not reflect actual investment results, and are not guarantees of  future 
results. Results may vary with each use and over time. These hypothetical returns 
are used for discussion purposes only and are not intended to represent, and should 
not be construed to represent, predictions of  future rates of  return. Actual returns 
may vary significantly.
Notes
 1. This chapter studies the use of  Monte Carlo simulations for predicting future wealth 
outcomes. Other uses, such as to assess liability hedging, are not analyzed in this chapter.
 2. Computed using a mean of  9.9 percent and standard deviation of  17.26 percent, the 
sample estimates from annual global returns from 1900 to 2011.
 3. See Mandelbrot (1963), Fama (1963), and Taleb (2010).
 4. Investment horizons of  ten and 20 years yield similar conclusions.
 5. A  greater impact would be observed as one moves more into the tails. I  have only 
examined the fifth percentile here, although the differences in results may be more pro-
nounced in the first percentile.
 6. Jorion (2003) shows that the empirical evidence on mean reversion in historical stock 
returns is weak, particularly in global returns.
 7. For t ≥ 2003, I use returns from t to 2011, then from 1900 on until I have a ten-year 
period. This is to ensure that returns in the first and last ten years are not under-sampled.
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 8. This is not to say that long-term returns are less risky than short-term returns. The distri-
bution of  wealth outcomes grows with the investment horizon.
 9. It is more common to assume an expected equity premium over a risk-free rate. Since 
my goal is to illustrate the impact of  uncertainty around expected returns, I examine 
total equity returns for the sake of  simplicity.
 10. If  returns are normally distributed, a 95 percent confidence interval for the mean would 
range from 6.7 percent to 13.1 percent.
 11. The standard error equals the standard deviation divided by N .
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